89 Egalitarian Equivalence and Strategyproofness in the Queueing Problem
- Youngsup Chun, Manipushpak Mitra, Suresh Mutuswami
- no.89.pdf
Abstract
We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner
and Schmeidler [21]) together with queue eciency and strategyproofness in the
context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms
satisfying the three requirements. Though there is no mechanism in this class
satisfying budget balance, feasible mechanisms exist. We also show that it is
impossible to nd a mechanism satisfying queue eciency, egalitarian equivalence
and a stronger notion of strategyproofness called weak group strategyproofness. In
addition, we show that generically there is no mechanism satisfying two normative
notions, egalitarian equivalence and no-envy, together.
Keywords: Queueing problem, queue eciency, strategyproofness, egalitarian equivalence, budget balance, feasibility, weak group strategyproofness, no-envy
JEL classification: C72, D63, D82