93 Welfare Lower Bounds and Strategyproofness in the Queueing Problem
- Youngsub Chun and Duygu Yengin
- no.93.pdf
Abstract
We investigate the implications of welfare lower bounds together with queue-efficiency
and strategyproofness in the context of the queueing problem. As a consequence, we provide
alternative characterizations of the k-pivotal mechanisms (Mitra and Mutuswami [13]).
First, we introduce the k-welfare lower bound, which ensures that no agent is worse off
than the case where she is assigned to the kth position in the queue without any monetary
transfer. For each k; we show that the k-pivotal mechanisms generate the minimal budget
deficit in each queueing problem among all mechanisms satisfying queue-efficiency, strategyproofness
and the k-welfare lower bound. Next, we consider a well-known welfare lower
bound, the identical preferences lower bound and show that when there are odd number of
agents, the k-pivotal mechanisms with k = n+1
2 generate the minimal budget deficit in each
queueing problem among all mechanisms satisfying queue-efficiency, strategyproofness and
the identical preferences lower bound.
JEL classification: C72, D63, D71, D82