90 Characterizations of Some Strategyproof Mechanisms in the Queueing Problem
- Youngsub Chun, Manipushpak Mitra, Suresh Mutuswami
- no.90.pdf
Abstract
We investigate mechanisms satisfying queue efficiency,
equal treatment of equals and strategyproofness in the context of queueing
models. We give two results here. First, we present a simpler proof of
Kayi and Ramaekers’ [9] characterization of the symmetrically balanced
VCG mechanism. Second, we use independence axioms, introduced by
Chun [2] and Maniquet [10], to characterize the pivotal and the rewardbased
pivotal mechanisms (Mitra and Mutuswami [12]).
Keywords: C72, D63, D82
JEL classification: Queueing problem, equal treatment of equals, strategyproofness,